Kim J. Ruhl

International trade is frequently thought of as a production technology in which the inputs are exports and the outputs are imports. Exports are transformed into imports at the rate of the price of exports relative to the price of imports: the reciprocal of the terms of trade. Cast this way, a change in the terms of trade acts as a productivity shock. Or does it? In this paper, we show that this line of reasoning cannot work in standard models. Starting with a simple model and then generalizing, we show that changes in the terms of trade have no first-order effect on productivity when output is measured as chain-weighted real GDP. The terms of trade do affect real income and consumption in a country, and we show how measures of real income change with the terms of trade at business cycle frequencies and during financial crises.

We propose a methodology for studying changes in bilateral trade due to countries exporting goods that they did not export previously, or exported only in small quantities. Applying this methodology to countries pairs that undergo trade liberalization and to pairs where one of the countries undergoes significant structural transformation, we find large increases on this extensive — or new goods — margin. Looking at country pairs with no major trade policy change or structural change, however, we find little or no increases on the extensive margin. Studying time series on trade by commodity, we find that data from before 1988 and 1989, when most major trading countries moved to the Harmonized System, are not compatible with data from afterwards.

Abrahamsen, Aeppli, Atukeren, Graff, Müller and Schips (2004) object to Kehoe and Prescott’s (2002) characterization of the Swiss economy as being in a great depression over the period 1974-2000. They argue that (1) depressions should be defined in terms of declines in labor productivity rather than in GDP; (2) examining deviations from trend in GDP is equivalent to examining levels; (3) Swiss data from the 1970s should be ignored because it is of low quality and because the 1970s were a period of turmoil in the Swiss labor market; (4) Swiss GDP data should be adjusted to account for appreciations in the terms of trade; and (5) the change in Swiss national accounts from a system based on SNA68 to one based on SNA93 will make Swiss economic performance look better. In this note, we find that none of these arguments have merit except for, possibly, the need to adjust GDP data for changes in the terms of trade. We conclude that Switzerland has indeed suffered a great depression and, in fact, is mired in it even today.

This paper is a primer on the great depressions methodology developed by Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2007) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007). We use growth accounting and simple dynamic general equilibrium models to study the depression that occurred in Finland in the early 1990s. We find that the sharp drop in real GDP over the period 1990-93 was driven by a combination of a drop in total factor productivity (TFP) during 1990-92 and of increases in taxes on labor and consumption and increases in government consumption during 1989-94, which drove down hours worked in Finland. We attempt to endogenize the drop in TFP in variants of the model with an investment sector and with terms-of-trade shocks but are unsuccessful.

We construct a dynamic discrete choice model of exporting and calibrate it to the Colombian manufacturing sector. We find that the standard heterogeneous firm model cannot replicate the behavior of new exporters; in the model, new exporters grow too large, too quickly. The model also cannot generate the downward sloping exit hazard that is evident in the data. We assess the quantitative importance of the slow adjustment of new exporters by fitting an export demand function to the data. When the slow growth of new exporters is taken into account, the present value of being an exporting rm falls dramatically. As a result, the entry costs needed to account for the data are 8 times smaller than the value in the benchmark model.

Throughout the 1950s and 60s real GDP per working-age person in New Zealand and Switzerland grew at rates at or above the 2 percent trend growth rate of the United States. Between 1973 and 2000, however, real GDP per working-age person in both countries has fallen a cumulative 30 percent below the trend growth path. Our growth accounting attributes almost all of the changes in output growth to changes in the growth of total factor productivity (TFP), and not to changes in labor or capital accumulation. A calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model that takes TFP as exogenous can explain almost the entire decline in relative output in both New Zealand and Switzerland. To understand the recent growth experiences in New Zealand and Switzerland, it is necessary to understand why TFP growth rates have fallen so much.

A sudden stop of capital flows into a developing country tends to be followed by a rapid switch from trade deficits to surpluses, a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and decreases in output and total factor productivity. Substantial reallocation takes place from the nontraded sector to the traded sector. We construct a multisector growth model, calibrate it to the Mexican economy, and use it to analyze Mexico’s 1994-95 crisis. When subjected to a sudden stop, the model accounts for the trade balance reversal and the real exchange rate depreciation, but it cannot account for the decreases in GDP and TFP. Extending the model to include labor frictions and variable capital utilization, we still find that it cannot quantitatively account for the dynamics of output and productivity without losing the ability to account for the movements of other variables.

In models of international trade, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods-the Armington elasticity-determines the behavior of trade flows and international prices. International real business cycle models need low elasticities, in the range of 1 to 2, to match the quarterly fluctuations in trade balances and the terms of trade, but static applied general equilibrium models need high elasticities, between 10 and 15, to account for the growth in trade following trade liberalization. To reconcile these contradictory findings, we construct a model in which cyclical fluctuations are caused by temporary shocks, as in business cycle models, but tariff changes are permanent. In the model, firms do not change export status in response to temporary shocks, while tariff decreases induce some non-exporters to export. In a calibrated model, the entry of new exporters increases the measured elasticity with respect to a tariff change to 6.4, while the elasticity in response to temporary shocks is 1.2.

Following its opening to trade and foreign investment in the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic growth has been modest at best, particularly in comparison with that of China. Comparing these countries and reviewing the literature, we conclude that the relation between openness and growth is not a simple one. Using standard trade theory, we find that Mexico has gained from trade, and by some measures, more so than China. We sketch out a theory in which developing countries can grow faster than the United States by reforming. As a country becomes richer, this sort of catch-up becomes more difficult. Absent continuing reforms, Chinese growth is likely to slow down sharply, perhaps leaving China at a level less than Mexico’s real GDP per working-age person.